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 NOTE 
Victims of Substantiated Child Abuse: 
Missouri’s New Reasonably Ascertainable 
Creditors 
In re Austin, 389 S.W.3d 168 (Mo. 2013). 
ALICE HASELTINE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A recent decision from the Supreme Court of Missouri, In re Austin, 
held that victims of substantiated child abuse are reasonably ascertainable 
creditors.1  The practical effect of Austin is to afford victims of substantiated 
child abuse an extra six months to file claims against the estate of his or her 
abuser.2  While this decision is a small victory for victims of sexual abuse, 
the facts in Austin raise controversial questions about whether the unique 
circumstances surrounding claims of childhood sexual abuse warrant an ex-
ception to the one-year claim bar against a decedent’s estate. 
This Note begins with an exploration of the unique factual circumstanc-
es that gave rise to the court’s determination that victims of child abuse are 
reasonably ascertainable creditors.  The Note goes on to discuss the constitu-
tionality of creditor claim bars and the evolution of the reasonably ascertaina-
ble creditor in Missouri.  Next, this Note provides an analysis of the Supreme 
Court of Missouri’s reasoning in Austin and – finally – explores possible ex-
tensions of Austin while weighing the policy considerations associated with a 
broad extension of the court’s holding to future claims of child abuse against 
decedents’ estates. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
In 2006, two female minors, R.M.N. and R.D.N.,3 alleged that Allen 
Austin sexually abused them.4  The Division of Family Services (“DFS”) 
investigated the allegations and substantiated the minors’ claims against Aus-
 
 * B.A., University of Virginia, 2012; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School 
of Law, 2015; Senior Lead Articles Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2014-2015. 
 1. In re Estate of Austin, 389 S.W.3d 168, 173 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 2. Id. at 169. 
 3. R.M.N. and R.D.N. were approximately seven and eight years old, respec-
tively, at the time of the alleged abuse.  Id. 
 4. Id. 
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tin “by a ‘preponderance of the evidence.’”5  Austin never appealed the sub-
stantiation.6 
Three years later, Austin died.7  Cathy Snead, a beneficiary of Austin’s 
estate, was appointed personal representative.8  On August 26, 2009, Snead 
published notice that Austin’s estate was open to creditor claims.9  This pub-
lication initiated a six-month time period during which creditors could file 
claims against Austin’s estate.10 
Following the opening of the estate, Snead, a social worker by trade, 
conducted an independent investigation of R.M.N. and R.D.N.’s allegations 
against Austin.11  The investigation included interviews with various mem-
bers of R.M.N. and R.D.N.’s extended family.12  Throughout the course of 
Snead’s investigation, she did not contact the minors, their father,13 or DFS.14  
Snead’s investigative work led her to determine that R.M.N. and R.D.N.’s 
2006 sexual assault claims were fictitious.15  Despite Snead’s knowledge that 
the allegations were substantiated by DFS, Snead used her personal 
knowledge of the allegations to conclude that R.M.N. and R.D.N. were not 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id.  A substantiated claim is not a determination of fault.  See Mo. Dep’t of 
Family Servs., Children’s Div., Guidelines for Mandated Reporters of Child Abuse 
and Neglect, at 5 (2013), available at http://dss.mo.gov/cd/pdf/guidelines_can_reports
.pdf.  A claim is substantiated when DFS determines that a minor is in substantial risk 
of physical injury by non-accidental means.  See id. at 7.  The state keeps a list of 
people who have been found to have committed “substantiated” abuse.  See id. at 30.  
Individuals on this list are considered at-risk for neglecting or abusing children in the 
future.  This list is used for various background checks for jobs that require work in 
proximity of children.  Id. at 32. 
 7. Austin, 389 S.W.3d at 170. 
 8. Id. at 170 & n.4. 
 9. Id. at 170. 
 10. See MO. REV. STAT. § 473.360.1 (2012) (“[A]ll claims against the estate of a 
deceased person . . . which are not filed in the probate division of the circuit court 
within six months after the date of the first published notice of letters testamentary or 
of administration or, if notice was actually mailed to, or served upon, such creditor, 
within two months after the date such notice was mailed, or served, whichever later 
occurs, or which are not paid by the personal representative, within six months after 
the first published notice of letters testamentary or of administration, are forever 
barred against the estate, the personal representative, the heirs, devisees and legatees 
of the decedent.”). 
 11. Austin, 389 S.W.3d at 170. 
 12. Id.  Snead contacted R.M.N. and R.D.N.’s aunt and grandmother.  Id. 
 13. Id.  The minors’ father was their sole guardian and custodian.  Id. at 170 n.5. 
 14. Id. at 170; cf. Bosworth v. Sewell, 918 S.W.2d 773, 774 (Mo. 1996) (en 
banc) (holding that “the failure of the personal representative to provide [the heirs] 
actual notice of the probate of a will precludes the . . . six-month statutory bar”). 
 15. Austin, 389 S.W.3d at 170. 
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creditors with a “colorable claim” and were therefore not required to receive 
actual notice upon the opening of Austin’s estate.16 
Eight months following the date on which Snead first published notice 
of the estate’s opening, R.M.N. and R.D.N.’s (the “minors”) father filed 
claims against the estate in the Circuit Court of Gentry County as the minors’ 
“next friend.”17  The claims included counts for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, assault, battery, sexual abuse, invasion of privacy, and civil 
false arrest.18  However, the court disallowed the claims against the estate, 
citing the six-month statutory bar in Missouri Revised Statutes Section 
473.360.19  In response, the minors’ father petitioned the court to reclassify 
the claims as an adversary proceeding.20 
Snead filed a motion to dismiss the minors’ claims against Austin’s es-
tate, arguing that the claims were filed more than six months after August 26, 
2009 – the day on which Snead first published notice of the opening of the 
estate – and were, therefore, untimely.21  Further, Snead argued that the mi-
nors’ claims did not meet an exception to the statutory bar22 and that the mi-
nors were not “known or reasonably ascertainable creditors.”23  The Circuit 
Court of Gentry County sustained Snead’s motion, and the minors’ father 
filed a timely appeal.24 
Upon review, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and remanded the 
trial court’s dismissal of the minors’ claims, holding that due process requires 
the personal representative of an estate to provide “all reasonably ascertaina-
ble creditors who may have . . . more than a merely conjectural claim against 
the estate” actual notice of the initiation of the probate proceeding.25 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In 1988, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down Tulsa 
Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, which held that notice by pub-
 
 16. See id. at 170, 172. 
 17. Id. at 170.  In Missouri, a “next friend” is a person “who, without being regu-
larly appointed guardian, acts for the benefit of” a minor.  See, e.g., Crawford v. 
Amusement Syndicate Co., 37 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Mo. 1931). 
 18. Austin, 389 S.W.3d at 169 n.1. 
 19. See id. at 170. 
 20. Id. at 170 & n.7. 
 21. Id. at 170. 
 22. Id.  There are exceptions to non-claim statutes.  See MCGOVERN, KURTZ & 
ENGLISH, PRINCIPLES OF WILLS, TRUSTS & ESTATES 670-71 (2d ed. 2011) (“A claim-
ant who had a suit pending against the decedent at the time of the decedent’s death 
need not present the claim in the estate proceedings. . . .  Claims which arise after the 
decedent’s death . . . can be presented within 4 months after performance is due. . . . 
The federal government is not subject to state non-claim statutes.”). 
 23. Austin, 389 S.W.3d at 170. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 173. 
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lication was constitutionally insufficient to bar the claims of certain creditors 
against a decedent’s estate.26  This holding called into question the constitu-
tionality of Missouri’s non-claim statute as well as non-claim statutes in pro-
bate codes across the country.27  For this reason, it is beneficial to analyze the 
due process considerations that have transformed Missouri’s non-claim stat-
ute through the lens of Pope.  In doing so, this Part examines Missouri’s non-
claim statute prior to the Court’s holding in Pope, the Supreme Court’s re-
finement of the “reasonably ascertainable” creditor, and, finally, Missouri’s 
response to Pope. 
A.  Missouri’s Non-Claim Statute Before Pope 
Upon the death of a testator, a personal representative may initiate pro-
bate.28  The probate process commences when the letters testamentary are 
filed “[i]n the county in which the domicile of the deceased is situated.”29  
Once the personal representative is appointed, that individual must publish 
notice in “some newspaper” and assert that the individual has been appointed 
representative.30  The notice must include a notification to the decedent’s 
creditors warning them of their right to file their claims in the court within six 
months after the first published notice of letters testamentary or administra-
tion – or be forever barred from doing so.31  This notice, which is published 
once a week for four consecutive weeks,32 is designed to make creditors 
aware of the strict time limit imposed on creditor claims found in Missouri 
Revised Statutes Section 473.360, which provides: 
[A]ll claims against the estate of a deceased person, other than costs 
and expenses of administration, exempt property, family allowance, 
homestead allowance, claims of the United States and claims of any 
taxing authority within the United States . . . which are not filed in the 
probate division . . . or which are not paid by the personal representa-
tive, within six months after the first published notice of letters testa-
mentary or of administration, are forever barred against the estate, the 
 
 26. 485 U.S. 478, 490 (1988). 
 27. See id. at 480. 
 28. See MO. REV. STAT. § 473.010 (2012); MO. REV. STAT. § 473.110 (2012). 
 29. § 473.010.1(1).  However, “if [the decedent] had no domicile in the state 
then [probate may be initiated] in any county wherein [the decedent] left any proper-
ty.”  § 473.010.1(2).  And “[i]f the decedent had no domicile in the state and left no 
property therein, [probate may be initiated] in any county in which the granting there-
of is required in order to protect or secure any legal right.”  § 473.010.1(3). 
 30. MO. REV. STAT. § 473.033 (2012). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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personal representative, the heirs, devisees and legatees of the dece-
dent.33 
Prior to the Court’s 1988 decision in Pope, Missouri’s non-claim statute 
included a second, long-term bar on creditor claims.34  This bar was found in 
a subsequent portion of Section 473.360 and provided that “[a]ll claims bar-
rable under the provisions of the six month non-claim statute, in any event, 
are barred if administration of the estate is not commenced within three years 
after the death of the decedent.”35 Throughout the mid-twentieth century, the 
U.S. Supreme Court handed down several decisions that more specifically 
defined the constitutional requirements for notice.36 
B.  Notice Laws Challenged by the Due Process Clause – The Rise of 
the Reasonably Ascertainable Party 
In 1950, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Mullane v. Central Hanover 
Bank & Trust.37  The case involved a common trust fund established pursuant 
to N.Y. Banking Law Section 100-c.38  This statute permitted beneficiaries of 
a common trust to receive notification of a judicial accounting solely by pub-
lication.39  The court in Mullane considered whether the beneficiaries’ receipt 
of notice by publication violated the beneficiaries’ due process rights.40  In 
addressing this issue, the Court explained, “An elementary and fundamental 
requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality 
is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise inter-
ested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections.”41  The Court held that the notice requirement found 
in Section 100-c was unconstitutional because notice by publication is unrea-
sonable to uphold a ban on a beneficiary’s untimely objection when “an effi-
cient and inexpensive means,” such as the United States Mail Service, is 
available.42  While Mullane established that there are indeed circumstances 
under which notice by publication is insufficient to satisfy due process, it was 
 
 33. MO. REV. STAT. § 473.360.1 (2012). 
 34. MO. REV. STAT. § 473.360.3 (1986) (repealed 1989). 
 35. Id. 
 36. See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); 
Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983); see also Brian J. 
Doherty, Comment, Notice and the Missouri Probate Nonclaim Statutes: The Linger-
ing Effects of Pope, 59 MO. L. REV. 187, 189-90 (1994). 
 37. 339 U.S. 306. 
 38. Id. at 308-09. 
 39. Id. at 309-10. 
 40. Id. at 311. 
 41. Id. at 314. 
 42. Id. at 318-19. 
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initially unclear how far Mullane’s holding extended and whether it applied 
to creditor non-claim statutes in probate.43 
More than three decades after the Supreme Court handed down Mullane, 
the Court again addressed the constitutionality of notice by publication in 
Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams.44  The law under scrutiny in Men-
nonite was an Indiana statute that allowed for a tax sale of real property when 
taxes remained unpaid on the property for fifteen months.45  The statute did 
not require that interested parties receive actual notice.46  The Indiana law 
further provided that the tax sale was followed by a “two-year redemption 
period during which the ‘owner, occupant, lienholder, or other person who 
has an interest in’ the property” may reclaim title.47  The property at issue in 
Mennonite was mortgaged in favor of the Mennonite Board of Missions (the 
“Board”), and when the property owner failed to pay taxes on the property, 
the county initiated a tax sale.48  While the owner of the property received 
actual notice of the sale, the Board did not.49  In its discussion of the uncon-
stitutionality of the Indiana notice statute, the Court explained, “[A]ctual no-
tice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will ad-
versely affect the liberty or property interests of any party . . . if [the party’s] 
name and address are reasonably ascertainable.”50 
C.  Constitutionality of Non-Claim Statutes Contemplated 
It was not until Continental Insurance Co. v. Moseley that the holdings 
of Mullane and Mennonite were applied to creditor non-claim statutes.51  In 
Continental Insurance, creditors of a decedent’s estate argued that a Nevada 
non-claim statute, which provided that a claim not filed within sixty days of 
the first instance of publication by notice was forever barred, violated the 
creditors’ rights under the Due Process Clause.52  The Supreme Court of Ne-
vada rejected their argument, citing the important function of non-claim stat-
utes in the probate process.53  The court explained that non-claim statutes 
promoted the “expeditious and comparatively unencumbered means of ac-
 
 43. See Debra A. Falender, Notice to Creditors in Estate Proceedings: What 
Process Is Due?, 63 N.C. L. REV. 659, 663 (1985). 
 44. 462 U.S. 791, 792 (1983). 
 45. Id. at 792-93; see also IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-24-1 (West 2014). 
 46. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 793; see § 6-1.1-24-1. 
 47. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 793 (quoting IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-25-1 (West 
2014) (amended 1988)). 
 48. Id. at 792, 794-95. 
 49. Id. at 794. 
 50. Id. at 800 (emphasis added). 
 51. See Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 653 P.2d 158 (Nev. 1982), vacated, 463 U.S. 
1202 (1983). 
 52. Id. at 160. 
 53. Id. 
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complishing estate administration.”54  Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Ne-
vada held that notice by publication in the non-claim context was “reasonably 
and sufficiently calculated to provide actual notice to [the creditor].”55  When 
the case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, it was reversed and re-
manded “for further consideration in light of [Mennonite].”56  Upon remand, 
the Supreme Court of Nevada applied Mullane and Mennonite and ultimately 
held that the Due Process Clause requires that an ascertainable creditor re-
ceive “more than service by publication.”57 
Two years later, in 1985, the constitutionality of non-claim statutes 
came before the Supreme Court of Missouri in Estate of Busch v. Ferrell-
Duncan Clinic, Inc.58  In Busch, creditor Ferrell-Duncan Clinic filed a claim 
for services provided prior to the decedent’s death.59  The claim was filed 
eleven months after notification of the opening of the decedent’s estate was 
published.60  The probate court held that, because the clinic failed to file the 
claim within the six-month time limit set forth in Missouri Revised Statutes 
Section 473.360, the clinic’s claim was forever barred.61 
The clinic attacked the constitutionality of the statute, arguing that the 
six-month time bar set forth in the statute deprived the creditor of its due pro-
cess rights.62  In its analysis, the Supreme Court of Missouri distinguished 
Mullane and rejected the Supreme Court of Nevada’s holding in Mosely.63  
The court explained, 
In Mullane, and the cases following it, the person to be notified was, 
in effect, made an actual party to the litigation by the notice, and the 
judgment of the court operated directly on that person’s property.  No-
tice under a nonclaim statute does not make a creditor a party to the 
proceeding; it merely notifies him that he may become one if he wish-
es.64 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 463 U.S. 1202, 1202 (1983). 
 57. Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 683 P.2d 20, 21 (Nev. 1984). 
 58. 700 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1985) (en banc), abrogated by Tulsa Prof’l Collection 
Servs., 485 U.S. 478 (1988). 
 59. Id. at 87. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 87-89. 
 64. Id. at 88.  The court also cited Texaco, Inc. v. Short, wherein the Court held 
that a self-executing statute of limitations does not necessitate Due Process analysis.  
Estate of Busch, 700 S.W.2d at 89 (citing Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982)). 
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D.  Due Process Extended: Tulsa Professional Collection Services, 
Inc. v. Pope 
In Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, the court con-
fronted the dissonance between the strict language of non-claim statutes and 
creditors’ rights to constitutionally sufficient notice under the Due Process 
Clause.65  In Pope, the decedent, H. Everett Pope, spent more than four 
months in the hospital before his death.66  Upon Pope’s death, creditor St. 
John Medical Center sought payment of a hospital bill for Pope’s last sick-
ness.67  Pope’s widow initiated probate pursuant to Oklahoma’s statutory 
framework and published notice to potential creditors.68  The Oklahoma stat-
ute at issue required claims “arising upon a contract” to be presented to the 
personal representative of an estate within two months of the first publication 
of the opening of the probate estate.69   
This particular non-claim statute was far from unique.70  In fact, Okla-
homa’s non-claim statute mirrored non-claim statutes in most U.S. jurisdic-
tions.71  The hospital failed to file its claim within the two-month statutory 
period and, as a result, was denied payment.72  The hospital argued that Sec-
tion 594 of the probate code, which required that a personal representative 
“pay . . . the expenses of the last sickness,” nullified the two-month claim bar 
set forth in Section 333.73  The court of appeals rejected the hospital’s argu-
ment,74 and the hospital sought a rehearing at which time it challenged the 
constitutionality of the statute under the Due Process Clause.75  Both the court 
 
 65. Tulsa Prof’l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 479 (1988). 
 66. Id. at 482. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 479; see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 333 (West 2014).  The statute sets 
forth exceptions that were not at issue in Pope.  See § 333.  For example, a claim 
asserted by an out-of-state creditor “may be presented at any time before a final de-
cree of distribution is entered.”  Id. 
 70. The court explained that there are two common species of non-claim statutes.  
Pope, 485 U.S. at 480.  The first type of non-claim statute runs from the opening of 
the decedent’s estate and affords the claimant a narrow window (usually two to six 
months) during which the creditor may file his or her claim.  Id.  The second type of 
non-claim statute runs from the decedent’s death and provides the claimant with a 
more generous timeframe for notifying the personal representative (usually one to 
five years) of the claim.  Id.  Some probate codes include both a long and short non-
claim.  Id. (citing ARK. CODE. ANN. § 28-50-1010(a), (d) (1987); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 
15-3-803(a)(1), (2) (1979); MO. REV. STAT. § 473.360.1, .3 (1986)).  Oklahoma’s 
probate code, however, only included a short non-claim statute.  Id. 
 71. Id. at 479 (citing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-801); see also Falender, supra 
note 43, at 667. 
 72. Pope, 485 U.S. at 482. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 483. 
 75. Id. 
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of appeals and, later, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, rejected the hospital’s 
Due Process argument.76 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.77  The Court explained that 
while the hospital’s claim against Pope’s estate was undeniably a property 
interest,78 the Fourteenth Amendment protects exclusively against deprivation 
by state action.79  While the Court had previously established that the “mere 
running of a . . . statute of limitations” did not rise to the level of state ac-
tion,80 the issue at bar was whether the probate process was sufficiently inter-
twined with state action to implicate the Due Process Clause.81  The court 
held that it was and explained: 
Where the legal proceedings themselves trigger the time bar, even if 
those proceedings do not necessarily resolve the claim on the merits, 
the time bar lacks the self-executing feature that Short indicated was 
necessary to remove any due process problem . . . .  [Therefore,] due 
process is directly implicated and actual notice . . . is required.82 
Finally, the Court asserted that under the principles of Mullane and 
Mennonite, the personal representative of an estate is required to make rea-
sonable efforts to give all “known or ‘reasonably ascertainable’” creditors 
actual notice of the proceedings.83 
E.  Missouri’s Non-Claim Statute After Pope 
The Missouri Legislature reacted to Pope in 1989 by proposing Mis-
souri Revised Statutes Section 473.034, which required personal representa-
tives to provide “ascertainable” creditors actual notice.84  Proponents of this 
statute took the position that the legislation was a needed codification of the 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 484. 
 78. Id. at 485 (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 485-86 (citing Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982)). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 487. 
 83. Id. at 491. 
 84. Doherty, supra note 36, at 193.  Proposed Section 473.034 set forth: 
1. Within one hundred twenty days of the date of first publication, the person-
al representative of the estate shall mail a copy of the notice prescribed 
by section 473.033 by ordinary mail to all known or reasonably ascertainable 
creditors whose claims may not be paid or acknowledged by the personal rep-
resentative to be due as provided in section 473.035. 
2. The burden of proof on any issue as to whether a creditor was known or 
reasonably ascertainable by the personal representative shall be on the credi-
tor. 
Id. at 193 n.58 (quoting H.R. Res. 145, 85th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 
1989)). 
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holding in Pope.85  A codification of Pope was viewed as a valuable addition 
to the probate code because it would make personal representatives, unap-
prised of case law, aware of the need to give certain creditors actual notice.86  
While the Missouri Legislature declined to pass 473.034, discernable changes 
were made to Missouri’s non-claim statute.  Section 473.033 was amended to 
provide that “all claims not filed within six months ‘will be forever barred to 
the fullest extent permissible by law.’”87  Further, the bar in Section 473.044, 
which previously barred a claimant from asserting a claim more than three 
years after the decedent’s death, was reduced to one year from the decedent’s 
death.88 
In Missouri Highway & Transportation Commission v. Myers, the Su-
preme Court of Missouri had its first occasion to analyze Missouri’s six-
month non-claim bar.89  In Myers, the creditor had actual notice of the pro-
ceedings but failed to file a timely claim with the probate court pursuant to 
Section 473.360.90  In its application of Pope, the Supreme Court of Missouri 
reiterated that Pope did not void Oklahoma’s non-claim statute, but rather 
held that a reasonably ascertainable creditor is entitled to more than notice by 
publication.91  In Myers, the Supreme Court of Missouri concluded that 
“nothing in Pope . . . invalidates Missouri’s nonclaim statute . . . .”92  Further, 
the court held that the Due Process Clause is satisfied when a creditor has 
actual notice of probate proceedings.93 
IV.  THE INSTANT DECISION 
Two threshold determinations were resolved in Austin.94  The first issue 
before the court was whether a victim of substantiated sexual abuse is a rea-
sonably ascertainable creditor.95  Second, the court had to decide whether 
substantiated allegations of sexual abuse are “conjectural” claims.96  The 
court ultimately held that because a victim of substantiated sexual abuse is a 
reasonably ascertainable creditor, and because a substantiated claim of abuse 
is more than conjectural, a victim’s due process rights are violated when he or 
 
 85. See id. at 193. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 473.033 (2012)).  The old Section 473.033 
merely provided that claims not filed within six months would “be forever barred.”  
Id. 
 88. Id. (citing MO REV. STAT. § 473.444 (2012)). 
 89. 785 S.W.2d 70, 71 (Mo. 1990) (en banc); see Doherty, supra note 36, at 194. 
 90. Myers, 785 S.W.2d at 72. 
 91. Id. at 74-75. 
 92. Id. at 74 (emphasis added). 
 93. See id. 
 94. In re Estate of Austin, 389 S.W.3d 168, 171 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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she is denied actual notice and his or her claims are barred pursuant to Sec-
tion 473.360 without actual notice of the opening of the decedent’s estate.97 
The court’s discussion began with an explanation of the notice require-
ments of Section 473.360.98  The statute requires that claims against a dece-
dent’s estate be filed in the probate division of the circuit court “within six 
months after the date of the first published notice of letters testamentary.”99  
However, the statute provides that “if notice was actually mailed to, or served 
upon, such creditor,” the creditor has only two months after the date the no-
tice was mailed to file his or her claim.100  The statute further provides that 
claims not brought within these strict windows are “forever barred against the 
estate.”101 
The court’s analysis began with an explanation of the purpose of notice 
in a legal proceeding.102  The court cited Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust – the “seminal case” on a claimant’s due process rights – to establish 
that a “proceeding which is to be accorded finality” requires “notice reasona-
bly calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objec-
tions.”103 
After explaining the reason for statutory notice requirements, the court 
then reiterated the U.S. Supreme Court’s most fundamental assertions regard-
ing notice and due process, explaining that “[a claimant] is entitled to actual 
notice as a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will 
adversely affect the liberty or property interests of [that claimant] . . . if its 
name and address are reasonably ascertainable.”104  The court then explained 
that R.M.N. and R.D.N.’s claims of sexual abuse were property as provided 
in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that causes of action are “property interests” in this con-
text.105  The court determined that, because reasonably ascertainable claim-
ants are entitled to actual notice when their property is adversely affected by a 
proceeding, and because causes of action are property interests, R.M.N. and 
R.D.N. were entitled to actual notice, but only if they were “reasonably ascer-
tainable claimants.”106 
 
 97. Id. at 172-73. 
 98. Id. at 171. 
 99. Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 473.360 (2012)). 
 100. Id. (quoting § 473.360). 
 101. Id. (quoting § 473.360). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 
(1950)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 104. Id. (quoting Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. 306). 
 105. Id. at 171-73 (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 
(1982)). 
 106. Id. at 172. 
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The court next inquired as to whether R.M.N. and R.D.N. were indeed 
creditors entitled to actual notice.107  The court explained that a claimant is 
entitled to actual notice only if she meets a two-pronged test: the claimant 
must be “reasonably ascertainable,” and the claim must be more than “merely 
conjectural.”108  The court first analyzed whether R.M.N. and R.D.N.’s iden-
tities as creditors were reasonably ascertainable.109  The court cited Snead’s 
personal investigation into the legitimacy of the minors’ claims as an indica-
tion that Snead was aware of the potential claims against the estate.110  Fur-
ther, the court cited Snead’s conversations with the minors’ aunt and grand-
mother as grounds for concluding that Snead had the resources necessary to 
locate R.M.N. and R.D.N.’s father and serve him notice.111 
After the court concluded that the minors were reasonably ascertainable 
creditors, it next analyzed whether their substantiated claims of sexual abuse 
were “merely conjectural” claims against the estate.112  The court explained 
that the Supreme Court of Missouri had not provided a working definition of 
“conjectural.”113  For this reason, the court looked to the plain meaning of the 
word as provided in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary.114  The 
court explained that “conjectural” means “of the nature of or involving or 
based on conjecture” or “inference or conclusion drawn or deduced by sur-
mise or guesswork.”115  Applying the facts to this definition, the court ex-
plained that it would be contrary to the plain meaning of the word to conclude 
that R.M.N. and R.D.N.’s claims were conjectural.116  The court reasoned that 
claims that were substantiated by a preponderance of the evidence were nei-
ther deduced by guesswork nor presumed from defective or presumptive evi-
dence.117  Ultimately, the court concluded that R.M.N. and R.D.N. were rea-
sonably ascertainable creditors with more than conjectural claims against 
Austin’s estate.118 
Next, the court analyzed the facts of an analogous case from the Su-
preme Court of Alabama.119  In American Home Assurance Co. v. Gaylor, an 
insurance company was not provided notice of the opening of the decedent’s 
estate and failed to file a timely claim as required by the Alabama non-claim 
 
 107. Id. at 171-72. 
 108. Id. at 172. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 173. 
 112. Id. at 172. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 173. 
 119. Id. at 172-73. 
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statute.120  American Home argued that the bar was a deprivation of its due 
process rights because the company was a reasonably ascertainable credi-
tor.121  The executor of the Gaylor estate had knowledge of an accident in-
volving the decedent and a tractor-trailer, but the executor was unaware of 
any injuries resulting from the accident.122  The Alabama court held that even 
if “the [executor] ‘was not aware that [the truck driver] had been injured in 
any way,’ the knowledge of the accident required her ‘to inquire into the pos-
sibility of a claim’” based on the knowledge she was provided in the accident 
report.123  The accident report contained the truck driver’s contact infor-
mation, which provided the executor “reasonable means of ascertaining the 
existence of a claim.”124 
The court compared the insurance company claim in Gaylor to R.M.N. 
and R.D.N.’s claim against Austin’s estate.125  In analogizing the two situa-
tions, the court explained that – like the executor’s knowledge of the tractor-
trailer accident – Snead had knowledge of the minors’ allegations of sexual 
abuse against Austin.126  Furthermore, just as the executor in Gaylor had the 
accident report with the potential claimant’s contact information, Snead con-
tacted several members of the minors’ family and was therefore in a position 
to access the contact information necessary for providing notice.127 
The court concluded that Snead deviated from her responsibilities as 
personal representative when she declined to provide R.M.N. and R.D.N. 
with notice of Austin’s probate proceeding, explaining that it was not the duty 
of the personal representative to determine whether a claim against an estate 
has “legal merit.”128  The court reiterated that it was Snead’s responsibility to 
provide notice to reasonably ascertainable creditors with more than conjec-
tural claims, and Snead failed to do this.129  Ultimately, the court concluded 
that the minors’ due process rights were violated when their claims were 
barred pursuant to the six-month time limitation set forth in Section 
473.360.130  Because the minors’ claim should not have been dismissed, the 
court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case.131 
 
 120. Id. at 172 (citing Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Gaylor, 894 So. 2d 656, 657 
(Ala. 2004)). 
 121. Id. (citing Am. Home Assurance, 894 So. 2d at 658). 
 122. Id. (citing Am. Home Assurance, 894 So. 2d at 660). 
 123. Id. (quoting Am. Home Assurance, 894 So. 2d at 660-61) (alteration in origi-
nal). 
 124. Id. (citing Am. Home Assurance, 894 So. 2d at 660-61). 
 125. Id. at 173. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
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V.  COMMENT 
Because R.M.N.’s and R.D.N.’s father asserted claims prior to the uni-
versal one-year time bar set forth in Section 473.444,132 the court in Austin 
was able to limit its analysis to whether a victim of substantiated sexual abuse 
is a reasonably ascertainable creditor.133  The court’s holding – that such a 
victim is reasonably ascertainable and, therefore, not barred by the six-month 
claim bar set forth in Section 473.360 – is significant for victims of sexual 
abuse: Austin effectively affords a victim of substantiated sexual abuse an 
extra six months to file a claim against the estate of his or her perpetrator.  
However, the court’s discussion of Snead’s personal knowledge of the DFS 
investigation and its ultimate substantiation of the allegations of R.M.N. and 
R.D.N. raises questions about just how far this holding can be extended to 
other victims of sexual abuse and whether an exception to the claim bar is 
warranted. 
A.  Must a Claim Be “Substantiated” to Circumvent the Six-Month 
Claim Bar? 
Two factual considerations weighed heavily on the court’s determina-
tion that R.M.N. and R.D.N. were reasonably ascertainable creditors.134  First, 
Snead, acting as personal representative, personally investigated the validity 
of the claims.135  In its discussion of this particular fact, the court explained, 
“[T]he children’s identity was known or reasonably ascertainable to Snead 
because she was aware of the underlying events that led to the potential 
claims.”136  This might suggest that when a personal representative is aware 
of claims of sexual abuse, the individuals asserting those claims are reasona-
bly ascertainable.  Alternatively, where a personal representative is not aware 
of any incident or allegations of abuse, the creditor may not be reasonably 
ascertainable.  It is not entirely clear what role the personal representative’s 
subjective knowledge played in the court’s analysis. 
The second fact that weighed on the court’s analysis was the finding that 
the claims were substantiated by a preponderance of the evidence by DFS.137  
While substantiation is not conclusive of misconduct, it requires the service 
to gather physical and testimonial evidence and conclude that it is more likely 
than not that abuse occurred.138  When DFS makes a finding of substantiated 
abuse, the state is required to publish the identity of the alleged perpetrator in 
 
 132. MO REV. STAT. § 473.444 (2012). 
 133. Austin, 389 S.W.3d at 169-71. 
 134. Id. at 172-73. 
 135. Id. at 173. 
 136. Id. at 172 (emphasis added). 
 137. Id. at 172. 
 138. See generally MO. DEP’T OF FAMILY SERVS., supra note 6 (outlining the pro-
cess for reporting and investigating child abuse and neglect in Missouri). 
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the state’s sexual abuse registry.139  Is it the decedent’s existence in this regis-
ter that puts a personal representative on notice of potential claimants?  Or, is 
the personal representative’s personal knowledge of an unsubstantiated claim 
sufficient to make the claimant reasonably ascertainable?  The role of DFS 
substantiation remains unclear in the court’s analysis. 
B.  Possible Exception to Claim Bar for Claims of Sexual Abuse of a 
Child 
There are well-founded exceptions to claims that arise after a decedent’s 
death.  For example, the Uniform Probate Code provides that a claim arising 
after a decedent’s death can be asserted within four months of the date the 
claim arises or performance is due.140  However, Missouri Revised Statutes 
Section 473.360 provides that all claims, “whether due or to become due, 
absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract or 
otherwise,” must be asserted within the strict timeframes set forth in Mis-
souri’s non-claim statute.141  The practical effect of this language is to require 
that claims be presented before the expiration of the non-claim even though 
the claim will not necessarily be paid during administration.142  While the 
court in Austin found that the claim was not conjectural, this conclusion was 
based on Snead’s knowledge of the abuse and (or) DFS’s substantiation.143  
The very facts in Austin that deem this particular claim non-conjectural are 
the same facts that make this claim arise before the death of the decedent and, 
thus, outside the realm of this exception.  While Austin does not address 
treatment of unsubstantiated claims that are asserted for the first time after the 
death of a decedent, the court’s analysis in Austin and a literal reading of 
Missouri’s non-claim statute suggest that such a claim would be barred. 
The facts in Austin raise a controversial question: do the unique circum-
stances surrounding claims of childhood sexual abuse warrant an exception to 
the one-year claim bar against a decedent’s estate?  There are strong policy 
considerations cutting in favor of an exception.  The sexual abuse of a child is 
universally recognized as a particularly heinous form of tortious conduct.  
Despite the obvious need for redress, there are several reasons why claims of 
sexual abuse are particularly unlikely to be asserted within a court’s strict 
procedural framework.  Not only does a claim of sexual child abuse present 
challenging evidentiary hurdles, but also 90% of sexually-abused minors 
personally know their perpetrators.144  For this reason, minor victims often 
 
 139. See id. at 24. 
 140. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-803(c). 
 141. MO. REV. STAT. § 473.360.1 (2012). 
 142. MCGOVERN, KURTZ & ENGLISH, supra note 22, at 671. 
 143. In re Estate of Austin, 389 S.W.3d 168, 173 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 144. National Child Abuse Statistics, CHILDHELP, http://www.childhelp-usa.com/
pages/statistics (last visited Dec. 19, 2014) (citing HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG CHILDREN AS REPORTED TO LAW 
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feel incapable of asserting allegations of sexual misconduct against an author-
itative figure.145  Often years – and in some instances decades – pass before a 
child recounts the sexual abuse the child endured during his or her youth.146 
Delayed assertions of sexual abuse can also be explained on a psycho-
logical and social level.147  Neurologically, a child’s mind is capable of re-
pressing and later recovering memories of abuse.148  Additionally, social con-
siderations like embarrassment, shame, and self-blame can cloud a child’s 
conscience, ultimately deterring the child from confronting his or her abus-
er.149  These factors further explicate why tort claims for sexual abuse are 
particularly unlikely to be asserted within a narrow statute of limitations or 
non-claim statute. 
While an exception to non-claim statutes for sexual abuse claims is un-
precedented, these legitimate policy considerations are reflected in an excep-
tion to the statute of limitations in claims of child abuse.  For example, in 
Oregon, there is an exception for future claims by minor claimants who have 
suppressed memories of abuse or have “not discovered the . . . [resulting] 
injury . . . nor . . . should have discovered the causal connection between the 
injury and the child abuse . . . .”150  While the policy considerations that drive 
this exception mirror those supporting an exception to Missouri’s non-claim 
statute, there are considerations that complicate this exception in the realm of 
decedents’ estates. 
Statutes of limitations balance competing goals.  A procedural time bar 
should afford a claimant adequate time to bring a claim, but should also re-
flect the reality that evidence is lost with the passage of time.  One of the 
ultimate goals of this balance is to ensure that a defendant has a fair oppor-
tunity to defend against a claim.  Yet, a non-claim is implicated only when 
 
ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM, INCIDENT, AND OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS 10 (2000), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/saycrle.pdf). 
 145. See Cynthia Grant Bowman & Elizabeth Mertz, A Dangerous Direction: 
Legal Intervention in Sexual Abuse Survivor Therapy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 549, 605 
(1996). 
 146. Id. at 599-611. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 599.  The repression and recovery of traumatic memories is referred to 
as “traumatic amnesia.”  Id. 
The blocked-off memories, however they are caused, do not disappear alto-
gether, but appear to remain stored subconsciously, at times signaling their 
presence in ‘neurotic’ symptoms.  If an event occurs that is similar in character 
to the original situation, it can stimulate the brain to ‘replay’ the memory, caus-
ing a “flashback.” 
Id. 
 149. See, e.g., Caia Johnson, Traumatic Amnesia in the New Millennium: A New 
Approach to Exhumed Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 21 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. 
& POL’Y 387, 432-33 (2000). 
 150. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.117(1) (West 2014).  This statute only applies to 
individuals who are abused during minority.  Id.  Claims must be brought prior to age 
forty unless the suppressed-memory exception applies.  Id. 
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the alleged perpetrator is deceased, and, for this reason, the very evidentiary 
hurdles that cut in favor of an exception to the statute of limitations for claims 
of sexual abuse against living defendants cut even harder against an exception 
to a non-claim: upon the accused’s death, the individual is particularly ill-
suited to defend against false claims. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The court in Austin struck a practicable balance: a substantiated claim 
for sexual abuse is sufficiently rooted in factual findings to counter the con-
cern that posthumous, unfounded claims will be asserted – for the first time – 
upon the administration of the accused’s estate.151  However, Austin leaves 
the treatment of a category of claims uncertain:152 can an alleged victim assert 
an unsubstantiated claim after the six-month time bar when the personal rep-
resentative is aware of allegations of abuse?  Under Austin, an alleged victim 
may very well have a colorable claim. 
 
 
 151. See In re Estate of Austin, 389 S.W.3d 168, 172 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 152. See supra Part V.A. 
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